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In Re: Estate of Sarge 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 105 (Dec. 27, 2018)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE CONSOLIDATION RULE
Summary
The Court overruled the consolidation rule established in Malin v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange2 and held that a final order resolving a consolidated case is immediately appealable as a
final judgment, even if the other constituent cases or other cases are still pending. Accordingly,
the Court held that the appeal at issue may proceed because the challenged order finally resolved
one of multiple consolidated cases.
Background
Appellant estates through executrix Sarge filed a complaint for reentry onto property,
contending that respondent, Quality Loan Service Corporation (QLSC) violated NRS 107.0803
when it foreclosed the aforementioned property. Additionally, appellant filed petitions to set aside
the estates.
The district court consolidated the three cases and later dismissed the reentry complaint,
finding the trustee obeyed the law. The appeal at issue follows the dismissal order. However, the
docketing statement suggested the appeal could not move forward because the remaining claims
in the consolidated cases were still pending. The Court then required appellants to show proof that
the appeal could in fact move forward. Soon after, the United States Supreme Court decided Hall
v. Hall, holding that an order resolving one of many cases consolidated is immediately appealable4,
pursuant to FRCP 42(a).
Appellant contends that NRCP 42(a) should be interpreted the same way the United States
Supreme Court interpreted FRCP 42(a) in Hall, arguing that NRCP 42(a) is modeled after FRCP
42(a). Moreover, appellant argues Hall overturned Huene v. United States,5 which is one of the
cases relied on in Mallin.
Respondent contents that this Court is not bound by the Hall holding and that stare decisis
requires that Mallin remain the applicable law. Additionally, respondents contend that the Hall
holding is not suited for Nevada courts. Further, respondents argue that Hall did not overrule
Huene and is irrelevant to this court’s holding in Mallin.
Discussion
In Mallin, the court considered whether an order resolving one of multiple consolidated
cases is appealable as a final judgment without finality certification under NRCP 54(b). The court
answered no, reasoning that allowing an appeal before each case in the consolidation is resolved,
could frustrate district court proceedings and cause duplicate efforts by the appellate court.
Therefore, under the Mallin rule, an order that does not resolve all claims in a consolidated action,
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is not an appealable final judgment unless it is certified pursuant to NRCP 54(b). However, the
Mallin court did not discuss NRCP 42(a), which allows consolidation.
Prior to Mallin, this Court identified the ambiguity of the term “consolidation” in NRCP
42(a). Accordingly, the Court considers the history of the rule to determine its meaning. Before
Nevada adopted the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, it allowed consolidation under Nevada
Complied Laws § 9025.6 The law was modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact,
the language was identical to the language in FRCP 42(a).
When Nevada adopted its Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court had previously held that
joinder Nevada Compiled Laws § 9025 does not make two separate suits into one and that
consolidation under a rule with identical language did not create a merger in Mikulich.7 The
language from Nevada Compiled Laws § 9025 remained the same in NRCP 42(a). No discussions
indicated any changes in the meaning of consolidation. In fact, discussion suggested that the
Nevada rules mirror the federal rules. Thus, the Court stated that it is accurate to assume that the
meaning of the rule under NRCP 42(a) was consistent with the interpretation given under Nevada
Compiled Laws § 9025.
The Court identified another significant issue, noting that the federal cases the court relied
on in Mallin have been overruled. The Court was hesitant to depart from the doctrine of stare
decisis, however, the Court refused to adhere to it so stringently “that the… law is forever encased
in a straight jacket.”8 The Court reasoned that Mallin did not address the rule authorizing
consolidation or acknowledge relevant case law, and the federal cases relied on have been
overruled. Therefore, the Court held, the Mallin holding that consolidated cases merge into one
for appellate purposes is no longer accurate. Moreover, the Court explained that the Hall decision
is strong persuasive authority. Ultimately, the Court determined that there are significant and
important reasons to depart from stare decisis in the case at hand.
Conclusion
The Court overruled its holding in Mallin that cases consolidated in the district court
become a single case for appellate purposes. The Court further held that consolidated cases retain
their separate properties and that an order resolving all claims in the consolidated cases are
appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court held that the district
court order challenged in this appeal completely resolved the reentry complaint in its entirety.
Thus, the order is appealable and this appeal can proceed.
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